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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO
FRA.NK MAREK and GAYLE MAREK,
Appellants,

)
)
)

)
vs.

EARL LAWRENCE and SANDRA
LAWRENCE,
Respondents.

Supreme Court No: 38827

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Appealed from the District Court of the Second Judicial District in the State of Idaho,
In and For the County of Clearwater.
The Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding

Counsel for Appellants

Counsel for Respondents

Mr. Paul Thomas Clark
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

Mr. Mark Snyder
P.O. Box 626
Kamiah, ID 83536

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARGlJMENT ................................................................ I
CONCLUSION ............................................................... 3

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRlEF

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
C &G. Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001).

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

11

. ............................... I

ARGUMENT

The Respondents (hereafter ''Lawrence") in their reply brief fail to address the Appellants'
(hereafter "Marek") argument regarding the District Court's ruling on the Johnson-Adamson Deed
in the context of the well established law regarding interpretation of deeds.
The District Court was required to determine first ofall whether or not the Johnson-Adamson
Deed was unambiguous or ambiguous. While the District Court originally held that the language
of the Johnson-Adamson Deed was ambiguous, it changed its mind on reconsideration and held that
the Johnson-Adamson Deed was unambiguous. The District Court then considered extrinsic
evidence outside the language of the deed.
This decision by the District Court is clearly erroneous. Where a deed is unambiguous the
paiiies' intent must be ascertained from the language of the deed as a matter oflaw without resort
to extrinsic evidence. C&G, fnc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). After finding
the Jolmson-Adamson Deed unambiguous, the District Court is required to interpret the Deed from
the language of the Deed and cannot resort to extrinsic evidence.

District Court's holding is

erroneous as a matter of law and should be overturned. The language of the Deed clearly sets the
boundary of the Marek's property as where the Section 26-27 line lays.
where the Section 26-27 line lays is to determine where the Section

method to determine
line actually lays, via a

survey, the method to determine where the Section 26-27 line lays is not via extrinsic evidence where
the parties arguably thought the Section 26-27 line lays.
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Lawrence admits that the legal description is unambiguous but it is the survey that creates
an "anomaly" because it does not match the extrinsic evidence proffered by Lawrence. Lawrence
then cites a case which notes that uncertainties in a conveyance should be treated as ambiguities and
cites to a case where a uncertain point of beginning rendered a deed ambiguous. This case offers no
support to Lawrence. There is no ambiguity in the Johnson-Adamson Deed. The legal description
is unambiguous. The boundary is where the Section 26-27 line lays. Considering extrinsic evidence
against an actual survey establishing where the Section 26-27 line actually lays does not create an
"anomaly," it undermines the clear unambiguous language of the Deed.
If the Court were to adopt Lawrence's reasoning unambiguous legal descriptions in deeds
would be subject to challenge. Surveys would be meaningless. It would not matter where section
lines actually lay. All unambiguous deeds would be subject to extrinsic evidence.
Lawrence's claim that Marek does not argue that questions of material fact do not exist is not
accurate. It goes without saying that Marek contends that the Section 26-27 line lays where it has
been surveyed, not where Lawrence's claim it is based on extrinsic evidence. Regardless, the
District Court's holding in this material is erroneous not because of whether or not there where
questions of material fact, the District Court's holding in this matter is erroneous because it
considered extrinsic evidence in construing an unambiguous deed, which is clearly in error as a
matter of law.
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In Lawrence's second part of its argument, they argue boundary by agreement. That theory
was expressly rejected by the District Court and Lawrence did not file a cross appeal asserting that
the District Court was in error in that part of its decision. Thus it is not properly before this Court
and should not be considered.
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred as a matter oflaw by impermissibly considering extrinsic evidence
after finding that the Deed was unambiguous. Furthermore, the Judgment, and Amended Judgment,
entered by the District Court in this matter is inconsistent with the District Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order entered on November 22, 2010. Lawrence fails to refute well established law
regarding deed interpretation and instead asserts a theory that was rejected by the District Court and
not properly appealed. Lawrence's contention that this appeal is frivolous is incredible given the
District Court's clearly erroneous application of the law in this matter and given that Lawrence does
not even address the issues raised by Marek and instead advances a theory that was rejected by the
District Court and not properly appealed. As such, Marek respectfully requests this Court set aside
the Judgment, and Amended Judgment, find that the Deed is unambiguous, and enter an order that
the parties intent must be construed from the plain meaning of the language of the Deed - which sets
the boundary line as where the Section 26-27 line actually lays.
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DATED this _ _ day of October, 2011.
CLARK AND FEENEY

(ti§

By:
1.
Paul ThomaMClark, a member of the firm.
Attorneys for Appellants
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